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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY - Excr.usIVE CoVERAGE BY LoNGSHOREMEN's AND H.ARBoR
WoRKERs' Acr oF RArr.wAY EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY To EMPLOYEE FOR AcCIDENT ON CAR FLOAT-Respondent, a freight brakeman employed by petitioning railroad at its Jersey City yards, was injured while releasing the hand
brakes on a freight car which was being pulled off a car float docked in navigable
waters.
He brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,1 alleging
that his injury was caused by a faulty brake mechanism maintained in violation
of the Safety Appliance Acts.2 The suit was dismissed in the district court3 on
the ground that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act4 applied exclusively, because the injury occurred on navigable waters. The court of appeals reversed, holding that this act did not apply, since respondent's employment was not maritime in nature. 5 Held, on certiorari, such a case is within
the exclusive coverage of the Harbor Workers' Act. Four justices dissented.
Pennsylvania R. Co. 11. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 73 S.Ct. 302 (1953).
The decision in the principal case is the latest addition to the ever-growing
body of case and statute law which owes its existence to the ruling of the Jensen
case.6 There the Supreme Court held that a state workmen's compensation act
could not be applied to a stevedore engaged in unloading a ship if the injury
took place on navigable waters, because application of the local law would
prejudice the uniformity required of maritime law by the constitutional grant
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts.7 After several
unsuccessful attempts to bring Jensen and workers with similar jobs under state
compensation coverage,8 Congress in 1927 passed the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. This legislation provides the injured
worker an exclusive remedy against his employer,9 but coverage is limited to
those cases where the state law cannot be applied because of the Jensen doctrine.10 The act also excepts the master and crew members of vessels, who are

35 Stat. L. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §51 et seq.
27 Stat. L. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §1 et seq.
s O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 506.
444 Stat. L. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §§901 to 950.
5 O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 612.
6 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524 (1917).
7 For a discussion of the impact of this doctrine and its subsequent history see RoBINsoN, .ADMIRALTY 99 et seq. (1939).
s In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438 (1920), the
Supreme Court held that the Jensen doctrine of uniformity required the invalidation of
an amendment which added to the saving-to-suitors clause of the statute dealing with
admiralty jurisdiction the words, "and .to claimants the rights and remedies under the
workmen's compensation law of any state." 40 Stat. L. 395 (1917), as amended, 28
U.S.C. (1946) §§41(3), 371. A later congressional attempt to accomplish the same result
under a different guise met a similar fate in State of Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264
U.S. 219, 44 S.Ct. 302 (1924).
9 "The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee. • • ." 44 Stat. L.
1426 (1927), 33 u.s.c. (1946) §905.
1o 44 Stat. L. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1946) §903(a).
1
2
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left to their traditional admiralty remedies.11 The court's task in marking out
these jurisdictional boundary lines has been difficult. In deciding whether the
state act may be validly applied in a particular case, two factors must be considered: (I) the locus of the injury, and (2) the character of the employment
of the injured worker. If the duties of the work~r do not relate to commerce
or navigation but are ''local" in character, his remedy is under the state act even
though the injury takes place on navigable waters. This is the "maritime-butlocal" doctrine, a limitation on the rule of the Jensen case.12 The real dispute
in the principal case concerns the significance of the character of the employment
when the problem is choosing between the Federal Employers' Liability Act
and the Harbor Workers' Act rather than between a state compensation act and
the Harbor Workers' Act.13 The majority did not feel that the character of the
duties of the particular employee injured was significant. Their reasoning was
that by its own terms14 the statute 'applies to accidents on navigable waters
whenever the employer has any employees engaged in maritime service, irrespective of the nature of the duties of the particular worker injured. An
earlier Supreme Court decision, Nogueira 11. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.,15
was relied on by both the majority and the dissent. In that case it was held
that a railroad employee injured while loading freight into a railroad car resting
on a car-Boat came under the Harbor Workers' Act. From the standpoint of
maritime employment, the Court said it made no difference whether freight
was loaded into the hold of a vessel or into a freight car resting on top of a
vessel; therefore, the Jensen case was directly controlling.16 The four dissenting

11

Ibid.

12 Thus,

it was held that a carpenter. injured while engaged in construction of a
vessel could recover under the state act. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S.
469, 42 S.Ct. 157 (1922). It has been suggested by at least one case that there may be a
twilight zone rather than a boundary line between state and federal coverage, and that
either act may apply to accidents occurring within this zone. Davis v. Dept. of Labor and
Industry of Washington, 317 U.S. 249, 63 S.Ct. 225 (1942).
13 ''The Compensation Act in Sections 903(a) and 902(4), by indirection at least,
provides "that employment in maritime service and injury upon navigable waters are the
bases of coverage." O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania R. Co., note 5 supra, at 614. "The Court
of Appeals, we think, is in error in holding that the statute requires, as to the employee,
both injury on navigable water and maritime employment as a ground for coverage by the
Compensation Act." Principal case at 340.
14 ''The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose employees are employed
in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United
States (including any dry dock)." 44 Stat. L. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1946) §902(4).
15 281 U.S. 128, 50 S.Ct. 303 (1930).
16 Later lower court opinions dealing with similar fact situations and following the
Nogueira case looked almost exclusively to the locus of the injury when faced with a
choice between the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Harbor Workers' Act. See
Buren v. Southern Pac. Co., (9th Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 407, cert. den. 284 U.S. 638,
52 S.Ct. 20 (1931); Richardson v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 233 App. Div. 603,
253 N.Y.S. 789 (1931); Job v. Erie R. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 698; Gussie
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1 N.J. Super. 293, 64 A. (2d) 244 (1949), cert. den. 338 U.S.
869, 70 S.Ct. 145 (1949). A contrary case is Zientek v. Reading Co., (D.C. Pa. 1950)
93 F. Supp. 875, but the result is based on a misreading of the 1939 amendment to the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. See Job v. Erie R. Co., supra.
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justices in the principal case said the only question was whether respondent
was engaged in maritime employment at the time of his injury. The duties of
a railroad brakeman stamp his employment as "railroad" and not "maritime,"
the dissent argued, and therefore the case is distinguishable from the Nogueira
case.17 The dissent does not explain the basis for its assumption that the duties
of the particular employee must be maritime rather than railroad. The position
of the majority seems partly a reflection of a fear expressed by the dissent in the
court of appeals that the courts would be heading into a "chartless morass"18
if it were necessary to determine in every case whether the injured railway
workman's duties were railroad or maritime in order to decide under which act
he must seek his remedy against the employer. Placing the emphasis on the
locus of the injury provides a much more workable test for drawing the line
between the two federal acts. Whether or not the result is justified as a matter
of policy is another matter, since it is somewhat difficult to understand why
a railroad brakeman's remedy against his employer should change so drastically
when the freight car on which he is riding moves from the car-Hoat onto the
dock.
Richard B. Barnett, S.&l.

17 ''The nature of the employment is certainly not maritime. It was an ordinary
railroad chore, done by an ordinary railroad workman." Principal case at 343.
18 O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania R. Co., note 5 supra, at 616.

